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The Politics of Illusion:
Evolution of the Family
Support Act of 1988
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Women & Gender Studies
The enactment of the Family Support Act was the outcome of a
six-year legislative and administrative review of, and debate about,
welfare policy and programs. Heralded as the opportunity of the
century, it did little, however, to alter existing policy. This article
examines the evolution of the Family Support Act within the United
States Congress, spotlighting two important time periods leading
up to its enactment: 1981 to 1985 and 1986 to 1988. Original docu-
mentsfroin the files of the late Senator Moynihan, legislative spon-
sor of the Family Support Act, as well as a comprehensive investi-
gation of Congressional records of hearings and debates, media edi-
torials and commentaries, and extensive Congressional interviews
form the basis for this analysis which vividly illustrates the politics
of welfare policy-making in the United States. It concludes with ob-
servations about the policy implications of the Family Support Act
and offers insight into how its passage paved the wayfor the Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996.
Keywords: Family Support Act, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, wel-
fare reform, welfare policy, Reagan Administration
The Family Support Act of 1988 evolved out of a much her-
alded "historic bipartisan consensus" between conservatives
and liberals. It was Congress' first success in two decades in
changing the federal program of financial support to poor fam-
ilies (most female-headed) with children, Aid to Families with
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Dependent Children, commonly referred to as AFDC. Yet, ex-
pectations that enactment of this new legislation would chart a
new direction in welfare policy in the U.S. were not realized.
Even the legislative sponsor, U.S. Senator Daniel Patrick
Moynihan, proclaimed: "I am near desperate for it to be under-
stood that we are not reforming anything.. .we aren't going to
be able to do a lot."
Moynihan was right; the Family Support Act did little to
alter existing policy, to reform welfare. Centered on the themes
of workfare and parental responsibility for child support, the
intent of the legislation was to reduce the numbers of families
on welfare. Debates centering on restricting financial aid and
supportive services to one of the most vulnerable groups in
society-poor women with children-occurred in one of the
meanest conservative times in the 2 0th century and offered little
hope of remediating the structural inequities that exacerbated
the misery of poor families in the U.S. Despite the good inten-
tions of some lawmakers, real reform was doomed.
The enactment of the Family Support Act did, however, ex-
emplify the triumph of individualistic approaches to framing
and understanding poverty, the politics of policy-making, and
the power of political rhetoric. Antipoverty legislation intro-
duced in the 98th and 99th Congresses (1983-84 and 1985-
86) focused on the problem of poverty was lost to legislation
focused on reforming the welfare system. This change of focus
once again obscured both the precise character of social ills in
the U. S. and the appropriate remedies for their resolution.
This article examines the evolution of the Family Support
Act within the United States Congress. It spotlights two time
periods: 1981 to 1985, which concentrates on House Ways and
Means Committee activities surrounding the 1981 Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA) cutbacks in services to
poor families and the 1983 poverty hearings; and 1986 to 1988,
which focuses on the numerous House and Senate welfare
reform proposals and examines the strategies employed in
maneuvering them through the Congressional arena, culmi-
nating in the enactment of The Family Support Act on October
13, 1988. Original documents from the files of the late Senator
Moynihan, legislative sponsor of the Family Support Act, as
well as a comprehensive investigation of Congressional records
of hearings and debates, media editorials and commentaries,
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and extensive Congressional interviews form the basis for this
analysis which vividly illustrates the politics of welfare policy-
making in the United States.
AFDC in Historical Context
The Aid to Families with Dependent Children Program
(AFDC) arose out of the Social Security Act of 1935. Title IV,
designated the provision of financial assistance to widows
with children "for the purpose of encouraging the care of de-
pendent children in their own homes or in the homes of rela-
tives... to help maintain and strengthen family life and to help
such parents or relatives to attain or retain capability for the
maximum self-support and personal independence" (42 U.S.C.
601) through the creation of the Aid to Dependent Children
(ADC) Program. Since its inception, three major policy changes
(1962, 1967 and 1988) have altered both its focus and intent.
The focus in 1935 was to provide financial assistance to
children living with their mothers (or relatives) who were
deemed "needy and deprived of financial support" by reason
of the death, absence or incapacity of a parent, usually the
father (LaFrance, 1978). By 1936, 147,000 families received ben-
efits through the ADC program: 534,000 recipients, including
361,000 children, ninety-two percent of whom had a deceased
father. The federal expenditure was $50,000,000 (Rodgers,
1986, p.72 -73).
The 1960s brought substantive changes. The 1962 amend-
ments emphasized the provision of rehabilitative services to
AFDC recipients, established community work and training
programs for adult recipients and day care facilities for their
children, increased incentives to work, provided for rehabili-
tative services, and expanded efforts to locate absent fathers.
States could extend coverage to poor two-parent families with
an unemployed father (AFDC-Unemployed Parent program
[AFDC-UP]), a move signaling support for the preservation
of families. In 1967 amendments focused on work, in part a
reaction to the perceived failure of the 1962 rehabilitative ap-
proach. Recipients with children over age six were required
to register for work and training through the Work Incentive
Program (WIN).
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The 1960s amendments were set within the context of a racially-
motivated backlash against welfare in the previous decade, the influ-
ence of the civil rights movement, and the expansion of the welfare
rolls due, in part, to welfare rights activism. As the population of
what became known as "welfare recipients" grew and the ethnic
and racial composition and marital status of recipients changed,
welfare policy grew more stringent, restrictive, and prescriptive.
The initial aim of keeping women in their homes to care for their
children gave way to requirements forcing them to work outside
the home, handing over to others the care of their children.
By 1970, $5 billion was being expended on almost 8.5 million
AFDC recipients: 2,208,000 families with 5,494,000 children.
Recipient benefits averaged $46 per month/$178 per family
(Rodgers, 1986, p. 72-73). By the late 1970s, the welfare system was
widely considered to be inadequate, inequitable, fiscally burden-
some, and nearly uncontrollable. The resolution of the alleged
"welfare crisis" declared by President Reagan in the early 1980s
included several components: reconstituting the traditional family
as a basic institution of American life; redefining the relationship
between government and citizen; re-establishing the work ethic,
especially among the able-bodied poor; and in doing so, reducing
public dependency on government.
By 1986, an estimated 11 million recipients received AFDC ben-
efits. The average benefit was $352 per family/$120 per person per
month and the total U.S. expenditure was $15.4 billion, fifty-four
percent of which was federal (Files', undated). While the increases
over the years in both beneficiaries and expenditures were consid-
erable, recipients of AFDC still represented no more than 5% of the
U.S. population, while budgetary outlays accounted for only 1% of
the federal budget.
Putting Out a Call for Reform
Ronald Reagan came into office in 1981 on the crest of a conser-
vative wave. Ideologically, he found an audience receptive to views
he had held for years. Marshaling public opinion, he used it as a
platform from which to enact policies that both tapped and intensi-
fied skepticism about AFDC. In his 1986 State of the Union address,
he called upon the White House Domestic Council to evaluate pro-
grams targeted on poor families and design a strategy that would
meet their "financial, educational, social and safety concerns." He
was adamant that new strategies be devised that would insure poor
families' escape from the "spider's web of dependency."
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Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D-NY), an acclaimed
welfare champion, responded to the President's call and on July
21,1987 introduced the Family Security Act of 1987 in the Senate
(later renamed the Family Support Act of 1988). A key Senate
aide, reflecting with exuberance on Moynihan's actions, noted
that he (Moynihan) "jumped at the chance to do something
when Reagan mentioned it in his State of the Union." 2
Optimism prevailed in 1987. Reformers talked of a "window
of opportunity" for change: many citizens, concerned about the
worsening conditions of poor people but experiencing greater
personal economic security themselves, made the circumstanc-
es for this change politically viable and attractive. Here was an
excellent position from which to express compassion, and the
probability of altering the welfare system appeared quite good.
Yet, welfare programs, of which AFDC is the most prominent,
test the political limits of redistribution. Widespread and often
intense dissatisfaction with public assistance coupled with sub-
stantial conflict and endless debate about the "deservedness"
of recipients and over what government should or should not
do most often characterize the discourse. These debates were
to be no different. While amassing the political machinery in
1987 to once again "reform" the welfare system was not wholly
unanticipated, the passage of a welfare reform package-The
Family Support Act of 1988-was not wholly expected.
The focus of the Family Support Act was two-fold: to
enforce parental obligations to support children through paid
work outside of the home and to transform welfare from an
income maintenance program to a transitional support system
requiring recipients to participate in programs which would
facilitate their preparation for employment. This transforma-
tion would, it was thought, break the "cycle of dependency."
Strategies for accomplishing it included: enforced collection
of child support payments from absent parents, required par-
ticipation of recipients in education and/or work training,
secured government provision of time-limited transitional ser-
vices-child care and medical care to recipients moving into
the labor market, and the adoption of a new social contract.
This new social contract reflected a shift from financial support
as an "entitlement" to one of a social obligation to work, with
a corresponding societal obligation to provide supportive re-
sources to facilitate work.
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Evolution of the Family Support Act
The enactment of the Family Support Act was the outcome
of a six-year legislative and administrative review of and
debate about existing welfare programs. The debate which
began in 1981 centered on poverty gave way in 1988 to reform-
ing welfare. During the mid 1980s, participants not previously
so engaged in the welfare debates entered the foray: social
science researchers, policy analysts, theorists and scholars af-
filiated with both non- and quasi-governmental institutions. By
engaging in the debates they would also influence its outcome.
Thus, the history of the evolution of the Family Support Act
actually begins some six years earlier than President Reagan's
1986 pronouncement to re-evaluate welfare programs. It is to
that evolution that I now turn.
The House Ways and Means Committee Focus on Poverty:
1981-1985
In 1981 a new president took office and a Republican ma-
jority was seated in the Senate; both made explicit campaign
promises to reduce the size of entitlement programs. During
the first term, the Reagan administration proposed a 52% re-
duction in Food Stamps, a 29% reduction in AFDC, 64% in WIC
(Special Supplemental Feeding Programs for Women, Infants
and Children), 46% in child nutrition, 38% in Low-Income
Energy Assistance, and 20% in Housing. Congress, reluctant
to so severely cut programs that aided poor people, agreed to
a 14% reduction in Food Stamps, 14% in AFDC, 28% in child
nutrition, 8% in energy assistance, 11% in housing assistance
and a 9% increase in WIC. Proposed reductions, had they been
enacted at administrative request levels, would have decreased
social program expenditures by $75 billion, more than one-
sixth below prior levels. As it was, the reductions that were
enacted represented a decrease 10% below prior expenditures.
(See Bawden & Palmer, 1984.)
The enactment of the Omnibus Reconciliation Budget Act
(OBRA) in late 1981 caused an outpouring of concern about the
impact of the cuts on families, from both Congress (despite their
previous support) and a number of non-governmental organi-
zations. Democrats on the House Ways and Means Committee
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were the first to express concern, although they focused more
broadly on issues of poverty and the plight of poor families than
on the more limited issue of AFDC. The Committee's jurisdic-
tion over the major low-income entitlement programs includ-
ing Social Security, Medicare, Unemployment Compensation
and AFDC legitimized their inquiry.
In late 1981 and early 1982, a few Ways and Means
Committee members made field trips to five cities-Baltimore,
Detroit, Indianapolis, Seattle, and Sacramento-under the
direction of the Speaker of the House. Their purpose was to
obtain information on the adverse effects of the OBRA cut-
backs on poor families and AFDC recipients. Rep. Harold Ford
(D-TN), Committee member and Chair of the Subcommittee on
Public Assistance and Unemployment Compensation, likened
the visits to Robert Kennedy's 1960s Appalachian visits: a
"cross-country show and tell." Unlike Kennedy's visits, which
prompted a "rediscovery of poverty," these encounters stirred
the conscience of Committee members, providing them with
anecdotal evidence but lacking in substantive impact findings
(Primus, 1989, p. 25). Rep. Ford indicated that they "didn't (as
some had wanted) see evidence of the victimization of poor
women" and subsequently solicited support from organiza-
tions like the Children's Defense Fund and the Governor's
Conference to press for a more comprehensive study of the
impact of the cuts. Their endorsement was secured.
As Ways and Means Committee members coalesced around
the need to undertake an exhaustive study on the impact of
the 1981 cuts, the question of which agency would undertake
it arose: a non-partisan group was essential. The Government
Accounting Office (GAO) was asked to take the lead with
back-up from the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) and the
Congressional Research Service (CRS) (see also Primus, 1989).
The GAO study was well underway when the Department of
Health and Human Services (DHHS), previously resistant to as-
sessing OBRA's impact, contracted with the Research Triangle
Institute (RTI), a North Carolina-based think tank, to evalu-
ate the changes resulting from OBRA. Interestingly, each study
confirmed the others' findings: four to five hundred thousand
families (almost exclusively single mother-headed-households
with children) were eliminated from the rolls, recipients who
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lost eligibility suffered substantial losses of income that were
not made up by either increased earnings or other means, lack
of health insurance was common among former recipients,
and families terminated from AFDC faced increased emer-
gency situations in basic need areas: food, medical treatment,
and shelter (Primus, 1989). The GAO study was covered exten-
sively by the press and Committee members used the findings
to heighten public awareness of poverty. They anticipated that
by doing so they could influence perceptions and actions of the
electorate, and subsequently of key policy makers.
By 1982 official poverty rates were higher than in 1981; 15%
up from 14% (Danzinger, Haveman & Plotnik, 1986). By 1983
the official poverty rate would rise again to 15.2%, an increase
of 38% from 1978 (Day, 1989). Increased poverty rates were a
clear response to the severity of the 1981-83 recession and to the
reductions in government support programs. Unemployment
rates were also up: 1982 rates (9.7%) were 2.1% higher than
in 1981 (7.6%)[Green Book, 19881. The figures were discourag-
ing, but predicted by those who feared adverse affects from the
1981 cuts.
In 1983 the Committee on Ways and Means, prompted
by these and earlier findings, began Congressional hearings
focused on poverty. The hearings persuaded Congressman
Ford, Chair of the Public Assistance Subcommittee, and
Congressman Charles Rangel (D-NY), Chair of the Oversight
Committee, to request the CRS and CBO to undertake a
major study of children in poverty. What resulted, according
to Wendall Primus, Chief Economist of the House Ways and
Means Committee, was the most comprehensive study ever
done on this issue (Primus, 1989). Released on May 22, 1985 it
offered two new and important contributions to knowledge:
(1) a detailed demographic analysis of childhood poverty and
(2) a descriptive analysis of income inequality among fami-
lies with children. It was the combination of these activities,
Primus notes, that established poverty as a major public policy
agenda item in the 1980s.
The Neo-Conservative Influence
While poverty blossomed on the Congressional agenda,
conservative think-tanks flourished. But the notion of changing
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culture, not politics, prevailed. Neo-conservatives were joined
by the administration in claiming that "L.B.J. had changed aid
of worthy widows (AFDC) into a vehicle through which selfish
people indulged their desire for children without marriage
and forced taxpayers to pick up the check" (Berkowitz, 1991, p.
143). They realized, however, that criticizing the liberal policies
of the past was not sufficient; lasting change and substantive
reform would occur only with the institution of an alternative,
conservative vision of the welfare state in America. The intel-
lectual climate now in place was necessary but by itself not
sufficient to carry out a conservative vision that would trans-
form the social policies of the past. Political power, centered in
the Office of the President, was crucial and with the election of
Ronald Reagan it was now possible.
Thus, the welfare reform debates of the 1980s were struc-
tured differently than those of the past. What characterized and
differentiated them from past ones was that they took place
within a highly refined intellectual atmosphere. Although both
neo-conservatives and liberals participated, it was the neo-con-
servative arguments that complemented those of the admin-
istration and it was those arguments that the administration
used to justify their actions, albeit often after the fact. Liberals,
usually the champions of poor people's causes and the archi-
tects of reform, were confronted with conservative theorists'
proposals for reform, and it was these reform proposals that
the administration took seriously.
The proposals came from six books published from 1978
to 1986: Welfare: The Political Economy of Welfare Reform in the
United States by Martin Anderson (1978); Wealth and Poverty
by George Gilder (1981); Losing Ground: American Social Policy,
1950-1980 by Charles Murray (1985); Beiond Entitlement: The
Social Obligations of Citizenship by Lawrence M. Mead ( 1986);
Out of the Poverty Trap: A Conservative Strategy for Welfare Reform
by Stuart Butler and Anna Kondratas (1987); and The New
Consensus on Family and Welfare: A Community of Self-Reliance, by
Michael Novak, et al. (1987). These books represented a range,
albeit narrow, of arguments centered on the negative effects
of liberal social policy on the behavior and values of poor
people. The War on Poverty, they claimed, had made "welfare
a right, an absolute entitlement, that could not be rescinded
for bad behavior and had, by breaking down the psychological
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barriers that kept people off the welfare rolls, increased welfare
dependency" (Berkowitz, 1991, p.144). Public welfare pro-
grams were cast as a costly extravagance that increased rather
than eliminated poverty by fostering work disincentives. As a
collection, the works provided conservatives with a potent cri-
tique of welfare programs and serious proposals for reform.
Conservatives were now spearheading a drive toward re-
forming the system of social and financial supports for poor
people. The change they sought was not, however, directed
toward establishing more adequate support for poor people but
toward a position wherein the state would play a significantly
lesser role in assuming responsibility and providing for vul-
nerable people. The neo-conservative argument against strong
government intervention was a persuasive one for both public
officials and citizens. It was precisely the intrusive nature of
government, illustrated by the proclaimed failure of the War
on Poverty programs to eliminate poverty, they argued, that
exacerbated the deteriorating condition of poor people and
imprisoned them to internalized notions of helplessness, lack
of motivation, immorality, and despair. The mutual obligation
required between a citizen and their state had gone awry. It
was now necessary to free poor people from their imprisoned
state by forcing them to work, as others were doing, and by re-
ducing or eliminating their dependence on the state. Breaking
the cycle of dependency by reversing decades of social policy
was the administrative goal.
Welfare Reform as a Public Issue: 1986 - 1988
Thus, it was in Ronald Reagan's 1986 State of the Union
address that he called upon Congress and the citizenry to join
with him to:
redefine government's role.. revise or replace programs
enacted in the name of compassion that degrade the
moral worth of work, encourage family breakups, and
drive entire communities into a bleak and heartless
dependency.. .escape the spider's web of dependency
... the success of welfare should be judged by how
many of its recipients become independent of welfare.
(CQ Almanac, 1986, p.3-D, 4-D)
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Reflecting his distaste about welfare, he mimicked Franklin
Roosevelt's characterization fifty-one years earlier, calling it as
"a narcotic, a subtle destroyer of the human spirit." Reagan
inferred that the present welfare system could not continue as
presently designed and put out a call for change, which un-
leashed a flurry of activity within the Congress and among a
diverse group of non-governmental institutions and organiza-
tions. Welfare reform was now on the public agenda. It would
remain there over the next 21 months and result in the enact-
ment of legislation that would change AFDC for the first time
in 20 years.
In response to this call for reform, the National Governor's
Association (NGA) assembled a bipartisan working group on
welfare reform in March 1986. A number of reasons motivated
the Governors interest in reform-among them the "new fed-
eralism" challenge to move AFDC to the states, the political
appeal of the issue, and perhaps most significantly, decreased
federal funding for the WIN Program: Between 1981 and 1986
federal appropriations for WIN declined by 70%. Welfare reform
became the top priority of the NGA and in February 1987 they
adopted a statement stating their intent "to turn what is now
primarily a payments system with a minor work component
into a system that is first and foremost a jobs system, backed
up with an income assistance component" (NGA Welfare Reform
Policy, 1987, p.1).
The House Ways and Means Committee momentum from
earlier poverty hearings continued into 1986. The Subcommittee
on Public Assistance and Unemployment Compensation,
chaired by Congressman Ford, began hearings which focused
on the identification of appropriate federal responses to the
problem of poverty. By now, they had turned away from the
previous concern of the impact of poverty on families (Primus,
1989).
Meanwhile, a number of mostly non-governmental or-
ganizations set out to more thoroughly investigate the issue
of welfare reform, the issue Reagan had raised in his State of
the Union address. Their participation was symbolic of their
and others' unwillingness to allow the administration to have
sole authority in designing any new welfare approach. Unlike
welfare reform efforts during the Nixon and Carter years, when
the primary impetus came from and remained in the Executive
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Office, these organizations intended to make conscious and
concerted efforts to engage themselves in the debate and influ-
ence the outcome. In fact, during the last two months of 1986
and the first three months of 1987, six organizations issued
seven reports on welfare reform. The last report, issued by
the Working Seminar on Family and American Welfare Policy,
came out only days before the first Congressionally sponsored
bill was introduced.
The most notable thing about the reports, as Robert
Reischauer pointed out, was that they "revealed a surprising
degree of consensus. Liberals, moderates, and conservatives
generally agreed about what is wrong with the current welfare
system and what general directions reform should take." With
great optimism, he contended that "for the first time in decades,
(there is) a relatively hospitable environment in which to for-
mulate welfare policy, which, in turn, has allowed Congress
to move forward with reform legislation" (Reischauer, 1987,
p.4).
The seven reports arose from a diverse spectrum of groups:
two from the White House, one from a state task force, two
from independent think tanks, one from a coalition group,
and one from the governors.' A comparative analysis of the
reports revealed five broad themes around which a consensus
emerged: responsibility, work, family, education, and state dis-
cretion (see Deprez, 2002). These themes were "...proclaimed
as a reaffirmation of basic American values... their widespread
acceptance reflects changes in the political and economic envi-
ronment..." (Reischauer, 1987, p. 4). This observation was sup-
ported by David Ellwood (1988): He argues that social welfare
policies are acceptable to the citizenry only if they reflect domi-
nant cultural values such as the obligation to work, support
and nurture families, and affirm both community and personal
responsibility and accountability. The reports concluded that
regardless of intent, the result of welfare policy over the past
two decades had sharply increased dependency, lowered skills
among recipients, and raised costs for government.
Welfare Reform Legislation in Congress
The elections of 1986 turned control of the Senate back to the
Democrats, and a Democratic majority in the 100th Congress
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meant that the prospects of getting a welfare reform bill passed
were on the "probable side of maybe." A favorable review
from the Senate Finance Committee was crucial for passage; a
Democratic majority could better secure such action.
Early in 1987, Senator Moynihan was appointed Chair of the
Senate Finance Committees' newly established Subcommittee
on Social Security and Family Policy. Under the auspices of
the Subcommittee he opened up hearings on welfare. The first
hearing was held on January 23, 1987 and the last on February
4, 1988. In all, 124 witnesses testified, and over 3,500 pages of
testimony were published. (House and Senate hearings yielded
over 200 witnesses and more than 6,000 pages of testimony.)
Using the authority vested in him, he vowed to answer the
President's call to change the present system of welfare. The
result of his work, S. 1511: The Family Security Act of 1987,
was introduced in the Senate on July 21, 1987. In the months
to follow, the Senator would regularly refer to this bill as the
"Governor's Bill," a move calculated to motivate their self-in-
terest and secure strong gubernatorial support.
The road to introduction on July 21st had not been easy;
there were many minefields in the Senate, in the House, and in
the White House. Maneuvering the bill through the legislative
process demanded the utmost political and strategic skill of
the Senator and his staff. The ultimate passage of the bill was
considered a tribute to the Senator's political wisdom, intel-
lectual prowess, and Congressional stature. Many in Congress,
when asked the question, "Why was it possible in 1988 to pass
a bill reforming the welfare system?" responded, "because of
Moynihan."
Early in 1987, months prior to the introduction of Senator
Moynihan's bill, four welfare-related bills were introduced
in Congress. The first, H.R. 30: Fair Work Opportunities
Act of 1987, called for an expansion of WIN funding but
disallowed funds for mandatory workfare4. The second,
S.514: Jobs for Employable Dependent Individuals Act en-
titled states to bonuses for successful job placement of se-
lected AFDC recipients-. A third, S. 539: Trade, Employment
and Productivity Act of 1987, introduced by Senator Bob
Dole (R-KS) at the request of the Administration, sought
to replace WIN with a work program requiring participa-
tion of employable adults (except for mothers of newborns)
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in state-selected work activities with child care and other
necessary supportive services provided6. The fourth bill, S.610:
Low-Income Opportunity ImprovementAct of 1987, introduced
on February 26, 1987 again by Senator Dole at Administrative
request, embodied the recommendations put forth by the
Domestic Policy Council Low-Income Opportunity Working
Group in 1986. This bill sought to authorize states to conduct
anti-poverty experiments of their own design with "funds ap-
propriated for income-tested benefits or allocated in part on
the basis of the distribution of low-income persons."
On March 19, 1987 Representative Harold Ford and 68
co-sponsors introduced a fifth bill, H.R. 1720: Family Welfare
Reform Act of 1987, in the House. It was the outcome of poverty
hearings held by the House Ways and Means Committee from
1983 to 1986. It was a partisan bill, the welfare reform bill of
House Democrats (which would eventually incorporate provi-
sions from S.610, Senator Dole's bill) and represented a con-
sensus which had developed within the House: by equipping
welfare recipients with job skills and encouraging them to seek
employment, welfare programs could end the "cycle of depen-
dence." It focused on adjusted benefit levels with increased
federal matching funds, national education, training and work
programs, Medicaid coverage, earnings disregard, child care,
extension of benefits to two-parent families, targeting of fami-
lies with teenage parents, and state discretion in administering
work/welfare programs. However, "Despite attempts to draft
the bill so that it would remain solely within the jurisdiction
of Ways and Means," the bill was referred to three commit-
tees: Ways and Means, Education and Labor, and Energy and
Commerce, on March 24, 1987 (Files, March 24, 1987).
On June 10th the Ways and Means Committee completed
action on H.R. 1720. Having considered more than 30 amend-
ments, it reported the amended bill to the House for consid-
eration: "The final vote to report was 23:13, along straight
party lines" (Files, June 11, 1987). Rep. Hank Brown (R-CO),
echoing Republican members of the House, stated: "This bill
is a tragedy. It hurts welfare recipients by restricting work
opportunities and keeping them in welfare" (Brooks, 1987).
Similar hard-hitting comments would be forthcoming from
the Administration.
Cognizant of the partisan and contentious nature of the
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House bill, Senator Moynihan and his staff mapped out a
strategy that could secure passage of his bill in the Senate and
the House and culminate in its acceptance by the White House.
Up until July 21, 1987, the day on which Senator Moynihan
introduced S. 1511: The Family Security Act of 1987 to the full
Senate, the Senator's staff worked tirelessly, negotiating with
Senate and White House staffers to draft a bill that would be
politically feasible.
Senator Moynihan's staff focused their "lobbying" at-
tention on both Republican Senators and the White House.
General agreement among Republican Senators was that
the "bill is a good one," but as of June 17, 1987 no uniform
Republican position had come forth (Files, June 17, 1987). Both
Senate Republicans and Senator Moynihan's staff were await-
ing a position from Senator Dole, the Senate Minority Leader.
Senator Dole's welfare advisor indicated, however, that while
the bill "was exactly the right thing to do," Senator Dole will
need "something with his finger prints on it, something he can
point to and say you (Moynihan) put it in the bill because he
insisted on it" (Files, April 11, 1987).
On June 25, 1987, Senator Moynihan's staff held a meeting
with the staffs of Senate Finance Committee Republicans and
the White House. The agenda for the meeting was to review
the components of the bill in an attempt to secure bipartisan
consensus before its introduction; at the least, they could as-
certain the basis of the opposition. At the meeting, disagree-
ment centered on mandatory participation rates for targeted
groups and the exemption of women with young children,
use of JOBS program funds for absent fathers, post-secondary
education (unanimous Republican opposition), transitional
Medicaid and daycare (Republican proposal to drop transi-
tional daycare), child care tax credit and Earned Income Tax
Credit (Republican and Administration opposition), waivers
and demonstration projects (Files, June 25, 1987).
By June 27th, with "Senator Dole... still holding back,"
Republican staffers were frustrated and angry; they had be-
lieved that the June 25th meeting was the decisive one. All
Committee staffers had recommended co-sponsorship to
their respective Senators (Files, June 27, 1987). Meanwhile,
the White House saw "the extension of assistance to two-par-
ent families" as a major problem, and opened up discussion
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on AFDC-UP, transitional child care, and Medicaid. Senator
Moynihan was cautioned by his staff that "you will lose all of
your Democratic cosponsors should you drop the two-parent
programs from your bill.. In past Congresses you have cham-
pioned the two-parent program" (Files, July 9, 1987).
Senator Moynihan and his staff met with White House
Welfare Advisor Charles Hobbs and other White House staff
on July 10th to discuss the White House's position on the
Family Security Act of 1987:
Mr. Hobbs began the discussion by stating that the
House bill (H.R. 1720) was totally unacceptable to the
White House and that it was getting worse every day.
The discussion then moved to the Family Security Act
(S. 1511). You (Moynihan) pointed out that if the White
House did not like the House bill, then it better see to
it that the Family Security Act has sufficient support to
serve as an alternative. (Files, July 10, 1987)
At the meeting, Hobbs appeared eager to point out the areas
of White House disagreement with the Act: Waivers-"did not
seem satisfied with anything less than complete adoption of the
White House position"; and AFDC-UP-" absolutely anathema
to the White House.. .dependency inducing... It was apparent
that as long as AFDC-UP remains in the legislation, agreement
in the White House is unlikely." In an attempt at compromise,
Senator Moynihan indicated a willingness "to drop the Earned
Income Tax Credit adjustment and the refundable child care
tax credit pensions" from the bill but steadfastly refused to
drop the AFDC-UP provisions (Files, July 10, 1987).
By July 21, 1987 Senator Moynihan's staff had managed
to put together a bill that had no strong opposition among
Republican Senators. Senator Moynihan, however, knew that
the legislation he was introducing that day was not "reform"
legislation. In memos to two colleagues he wrote:
On the one hand we aren't going to be able to do a
lot. On the other hand what we do will be very much
worth doing. The huge fact is that we are redefining the
condition of welfare recipients. They are not the coal
miners' widows envisaged in the 1935 Social Security
Act. They are for the most part young women, almost
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wholly without work, a circumstance that society
increasingly defines as unnatural and unjust. (Files,
August 5, 1987)
The cost is strikingly low. The benefits are not strikingly
great. But the re-direction of the program are worth it,
or so I think. In essence, we have at hand a bipartisan
opportunity to establish a child welfare policy based
on mutual obligation by society and family and mutual
obligation within families, or so I think. It is striking
how much we have lowered our expectations. In 1969
... a guaranteed income. In 1977 (Carter).. Program
for Better Jobs and Income.. .$15 billion a year. In 1981
(Reagan).. .workfare...minuscule in cost.. .but did take
hold .. .(Files, July 6, 1987)
As stated earlier, Senator Moynihan's strategy for support
and passage was to designate the Family Security Act the
Governor's bill: "...I have tried to draft a proposal modeled
explicitly on that of the Governor's" (Files, July 6, 1987). "We
call this the Governor's bill. The Governor's Association made
welfare change their number one priority for 1987, and these
are the provisions they asked for" (Files, Sept. 12, 1987). By
lauding the NGA's position on welfare, embracing it as consis-
tent with his own, and touting their readiness to aggressively
lobby for reform, the Senator attempted to depict the bill as
having broad-based support reflective of a national consensus.
This strategy would become important in the months ahead.
Following the introduction of the Family Security Act in
the Senate, Rep. Willis Gradison (R-OH) introduced H. R.
3148, the Senate version of The Family Security Act of 1987
into the House on August 6, 1987. In his introduction, he en-
visioned the Act as not only addressing the "current prob-
lems of America's welfare system" but securing "the shape of
America's future." (Files, August 6, 1987). In a private note to
Senator Moynihan, however, his tone was more somber: "It is
refreshing on a subject as highly charged as welfare reform to
see a plan which if it errs does so on the side of understatement
with cautious projections of job placement prospects" (Files,
August 8, 1987).
On August 7, 1987 Congressman Bob Michel (R-IL) and
five Republican co-sponsors offered a "Welfare Independence"
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initiative, H.R. 3200: AFDC Employment and Training
Reorganization Act of 1987. This bill, the Republican substitute
for H.R. 1720,
aimed at skill training and job placement for welfare
recipients, while granting states wide discretion in
experimenting with more effective welfare programs....
Michel characterized the proposal as a common-sense
approach to helping those who need assistance by
providing a future of independence, not dependence."
(Files, August 6, 1987)
The bill received wide support from Republicans and the
President. Rep. Hank Brown (R-CO), an aggressive advocate
for the bill, echoed many Republicans when he said:
We now have historic opportunity to reform welfare
by providing states with both carrots and sticks -
carrots in the form of new money and flexibility to
design employment and training programs and to
help people with child care and health insurance once
they leave AFDC, and sticks in the form of mandatory
participation standards for states and sanctions for
clients who refuse to meet their civic responsibility.
(Files, August 6, 1987)
In a speech before the nation's Governors on February 22,
1988, President Reagan lauded H.R. 3200 as a
cost-effective proposal allows for states to demonstrate
their ideas for reform of a system that is just not
working for poor people. ... Perhaps the greatest test of
federalism is how we meet the urgent need for welfare
reform -how successful we are in fashioning local and
community solutions to problems that would destroy
families, or worse, keep families from forming in the
first place. (Files, Feb. 22, 1988)
A Republican press release touted the bill as the only one
"receiving serious attention that could be endorsed by the
Reagan administration" (Files, August 7, 1987). The bill was
rejected by the House, 251 to 173.
By September 12, 1987, The Family Security Act (S.
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1511) had 55 Senate co-sponsors. In a radio address entitled
"Fiftv-Five and Much Alive," Senator Moynihan noted that
the 55 co-sponsors represented 37 states and 74.4% of the U.S.
population (Files, September 12, 1987). Presenting the bill to
the citizenry as one with wide-ranging, perhaps unanimous,
national support was critical to the Senator's strategy. By May
26, 1988, 62 Senators would sign on as co-sponsors.
Much of the Fall of 1987 was spent negotiating with the
White House staff, most specifically Charles Hobbs. Hobbs
was not supportive of S. 1511 or H.R. 1720. He noted "three
essential reasons" why he did not think the President would
sign either:
state flexibility is reduced through the imposition
of more top-down rules; the 'poor' are treated as a
class of inherently dependent people, who need 'case
managers' to run their lives, rather than as potentially
productive individuals with differing capabilities,
needs and aspirations; and incentives for self-reliance
and self-responsibility are reduced as rewards for
dependent behavior are increased. (Files, September
25, 1987)
White House Chief of Staff, Howard H. Baker, Jr., wrote to
Senator Moynihan that despite Hobbs' objections to S. 1511, he
stood "ready to try to work with you (Moynihan) to see if we
can structure a welfare reform package the President can sign"
(Files, Sept. 25, 1987).
Meanwhile, the Secretary of the Department of Health and
Human Services affirmed both the Administration's criticism
of H.R. 1720 citing "great expense to the American taxpayer
... increase(d) dependency while failing to assist families to
achieve economic independence," and the Administration's
support of H.R. 3200, lauding it as "true welfare reform.. .a bal-
anced, constructive approach that will reduce welfare depen-
dency in a fiscally responsible manner" (Files, Sept. 28, 1987).
On December 3, 1987, a modified version of H.R. 3200 (H.R.
3692) was introduced in the House. It did not pass.
White House opposition to S. 1511 remained fierce. In
private correspondence to a friend, Senator Moynihan wrote:
We are really into a 'last chance' situation, and I am
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near desperate for it to be understood that we are not
reforming anything. Reform: 'to restore to a former good
state.' We are hoping to redefine the entire program,
to make it possible for poor mothers to work. ... We
must act now. Before we lose another generation and
the country gives up hope or gets ugly. (Files, April 26,
1988)
On April 20, 1988 Senator Lloyd Bentsen (D-TX), Chair of
the Senate Finance Committee, announced that the Committee
had completed action on S. 1511: The "bill is designed to re-
structure the basic program of public assistance for families
in ways that emphasize parental responsibility through the
enforcement of child support and expanded opportunities
in education and training" (Files, April 20, 1988). President
Reagan criticized the legislation, threatening a veto if it did not
go beyond job training and include a provision called zvorkfare:
He had repeatedly threatened to veto any bill without a tough
work requirement. Senator Moynihan opposed the President's
demands. Negotiations between the Senator and the White
House took place over two months but to no avail. Finally,
both sides accepted a compromise proposed by Senator Dole
that required at least one parent in two-parent welfare families
to work 16 hours per week. This appealed to the President.
Senator Dole now had his fingerprints on the bill. Approval in
the Senate was now assured.
In June 1988, the Senate voted 93 to 3 in support of S. 1511;
the margin reflected "a broad and powerful consensus, cutting
across party, ideology and geography, that welfare must be
changed" (Stevens, 1988). The Governors had lobbied intense-
ly; their intervention was widely regarded as a critical factor.
Still, there was no consensus between H.R. 1720 and S. 1511.
In late June, the House voted to reject Senate amendments to
H.R. 1720 and to reject a Republican initiative to vote directly
on the Senate bill.
The House-Senate Conference Committee
A House-Senate Conference Committee was created in
July 1988 to mediate negotiations between the Democrats and
Republicans and the House and the Senate. The goal was to
produce legislation that appeased members of both parties in
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both Congressional houses and was acceptable to the President.
The central elements of both House and Senate bills-a JOBS
program and child support enforcement--were not in dispute.
Conflict did, however, center on whether recipients should be
required to work for benefits and whether increased benefits
would promote dependency. For the next three months nego-
tiations took place.
House conferees were selected from the four commit-
tees that had worked on the legislation: Ways and Means,
Education and Labor, Energy and Commerce, and Agriculture.
They were instructed to hold the "cost of the bill to no more
than the Senate measure's estimated $2.8 billion five-year price
tag" and to "permit no impediments which would disallow
work beyond those contained in the Senate bill" (Congressional
Quarterly ICQ] Almanac, 1988, p. 361). House supporters, as
well as the White House, were adamant that welfare not be
made more attractive than work and that recipients not be dis-
couraged from moving into paying jobs. By late July, conferees
dropped a provision enabling states to raise welfare benefits
with federal matching support.
Differences between the House and Senate bills were sub-
stantially narrowed during August: Agreement was reached
on mandatory participation rates for the JOBS program and
a work requirement for two-parent families on welfare.
Discussion continued on issues related to extended medical
coverage, earnings disregard, and tax plans that would raise
money by eliminating meal and entertainment expenses
for upper-income individuals. But "Still unresolved was the
touchy but central issue of whether, and how much, welfare
recipients should be required to work in exchange for benefits"
(CQ Almanac, 1988, p. 36). Senate conferees agreed to drop a
requirement that states participate in AFDC-UP and mandate
work from one parent but the Reagan administration threat-
ened to veto any bill that did not contain the 16 hour-per-week
work requirement. A lobbyist working on the bill noted that
"The White House is now in the incredibly ironic position of
threatening to veto the bill because it doesn't have (AFDC) UP
in it" (CQ Almanac, 1988, p. 363). By the August recess, a $400
million gap lay between the conferees-a substantial, albeit
smaller gap than the $4.3 billion they initially confronted.
Things heated up in September as the final days of the
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conference session got closer. House and Senate conferees re-
mained divided over a controversial work requirement in the
Senate bill. Both sides were adamant that they would not agree
to a piece of legislation they did not believe in; they worked
tirelessly to come to a consensus. Aggressive bargaining efforts
of September 26th and 27th paid off.
As with most compromises, both liberals and
conservatives in the end got what they wanted-
meaning each side had to swallow certain things it
didn't like.
Conservatives got their workfare in the form of a
requirement that one parent in two-parent welfare
families perform at least 16 hours per week of unpaid
work.
Liberals ... (gained) a requirement that states offer
benefits to two-parent families.. .a $1 billion-per-year
entitlement for state education and training programs
and a full year of extended child-care and medical
benefits for recipients who leave the rolls for jobs." (CQ
Almanac, 1988, p.364)
On September 27, 1988 the compromise plan, The Family
Support Act of 1988, was adopted by the Conference Committee
in a 35-8 vote. The Committee, which included Charles Hobbs
of the White House, had agreed to the first federally mandated
work program for welfare recipients, a plan designed to make
public assistance more acceptable and to address the "crisis of
public dependency." Included were: (1) a provision that would
require states to withhold the wages of absentee, non-paying
fathers, (2) a five year cost of $3.34 billion, (3) a requirement
that one parent in two-parent families perform unpaid work
(community service) at least 16 hours per week, (4) a delay
in the work provision until 1994, (5) an allowance for parents
under 25 years to complete high school education in lieu of the
work requirement, (6) extension of Medicaid and day care for
one year after leaving the welfare rolls, and (7) no restrictions
on the Medicaid and day care eligibility of former welfare re-
cipients who quit their jobs and rejoin the welfare rolls.
The bill passed in both houses on September 30th. In all,
14 days of debate and 28 days of hearings over six years were
held. In lauding the accomplishment, Senator Moynihan said:
Evolution of the Faiily Support Act
We had redefined the whole question of dependency.
This is no longer to be a permanent or even extended
circumstance. It is to be a transition to employment,
and it is to be accompanied by child support from the
absent parent. (Tolchin, 1988)
On October 13, 1988 President Ronald Reagan signed P.L.
100-485: The Family Support Act of 1988 into law.
Conclusions
What emerged in the compromise between conservatives
and liberals amounted to a tinkering with the welfare system:
a job program with stiffer penalties for recipients and more
opportunities for states to experiment with ways to reduce
the "welfare burden." The Family Support Act focused on in-
creasing work incentives, reducing the fiscal burden of states
for welfare, and compelling people to work as a condition of
eligibility. No substantive attention was paid to the lack of ad-
equate paying jobs, day care and health care benefits. Nor was
attention directed to issues of race, gender and class-elements
so much a part of welfare debates, yet so understated.
Heralded as the opportunity of the century, the Family
Support Act did little to alter existing policy. Its passage en-
couraged us to imagine that change had occurred when in fact
the change was merely illusory: it was "less a real restructur-
ing than a shift of emphasis and relabeling," an agreement that
"was always more rhetorical than real" ("House Rules ...
1987, p.A22; "The Senate ... ", 1988, p. D6). The Act was not a
radical departure from previous legislation but an extension
of it. It was not social innovation but status quo preservation.
The Act did not ameliorate nor address the problems that poor
people considered the systems' worst: sub-poverty benefits
levels, restrictive administration, and coverage gaps (Casey,
1989).
The enactment of the Family Support Act of 1988 exem-
plified the triumph of individualism over structuralism: it re-
inforced culturally biased notions of individually engineered
social problems, limited and conditional government interven-
tion, and work-based entitlements. The attention to welfare-
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5% of the population, predominantly single female heads-of-
household and children, who receive financial assistance from
a designated 1% of the federal budget-was neither about
money nor numbers but about a system of privilege, of double
standards, embedded in the fabric of U.S. society, reflecting
what Jeff Faux calls "the politics of evasion." This change in
focus once again obscured both the precise character of social
ills in the U.S. and the remedies for their resolution.
After twenty-five years of welfare reform debate we saw
not only widespread dissatisfaction with the public assistance
system but a corresponding unwillingness to address the fun-
damental causes of poverty. What Senator Moynihan and his
colleagues in the Congress neglected, as they tried to redesign
the welfare system, was that poverty and the underlying struc-
tural determinants that both cause and maintain it are, and
remain, well beyond individual blame: Policy that ignores the
causes of the problem cannot provide real solutions.
Setting the Stage for the Next Round
of Welfare Reform
Republicans, discouraged by the seemingly insignifi-
cant changes instituted by the Family Support Act, vowed
to continue working to reform welfare policy, to provide real
solutions of a different nature: restricted spending, reduced
numbers of people receiving assistance, decreased births to
single women, enforced parental obligations to support chil-
dren, required work, and re-established foundations for tradi-
tional family unions in America. They knew that passage of the
Family Support Act had been, in part, because of concessions
they needed to make to the Democratic majority to get reform.
But, under a Republican majority everything could change. In
1994 they got their chance: Republicans swept the House, the
Senate, and the Governor's offices-the Republican Revolution
had come. They were now positioned to make the changes in
welfare that they had waited for years to make.
So it was that in 1994, under the leadership of Speaker of
the House Newt Gingrich (R-GA), The Contract with America,
a plan whose concept far preceded its name, emerged. With
backing from Republican Governors-who had also felt the
sting of defeat when the NGA endorsed The Family Support
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Act-and with The Contract with America as its foundation
and centerpiece, Republicans placed two proposals before
Congress: The Personal Responsibility Act from the House and
The Work Opportunities Act from the Senate. Key aspects of
these bills included provisions that Republicans had proposed
in 1987: (1) abolishing the program of aid for single parent fami-
lies (AFDC) and replacing it with a fixed dollar amount block
grant to the states; (2) limiting the number of years that a single
mother may receive assistance; (3) (in the House bill) denying
benefits to children born to women under 18 years old; (4) re-
quiring mothers to identify their newborn child's father in order
to receiving benefits; (5) (in the House bill) denying benefits
for any child born to a mother already receiving benefits-the
Senate bill gave the state the option to decide; and (6) signifi-
cantly reducing federal health care funding to poor families by
over 30%. The problem of welfare dependency had taken center
stage.
President Bill Clinton, a former gubernatorial member of
the NGA Welfare Reform Task Force which had provided criti-
cal support in the passage of The Family Support Act, was in-
clined to support the House bill-The Personal Responsibility
Act-if it was coupled with the Senate bill-The Work
Opportunities Act-despite protests from his advisors and staff,
some of whom would subsequently resign. On August 22, 1996,
President Clinton signed into law the Personal Responsibility
Work Opportunity and Reconciliation Act (PRWORA), bring-
ing sweeping changes to welfare "as we knew it." States
regained more authority than they had held in six decades for
both financing and eligibility standards; the AFDC Program
was repealed and replaced with TANF (Temporary Assistance
to Needy Families); a "work first" ideology was instituted
forcing most welfare recipients into work within two years;
limited lifetime benefits of five years were imposed; federal
benefits were eliminated for most immigrants; recipients who
did not assist in establishing paternity of children born out-of-
wedlock were penalized; and the human capital approach of
The Family Support Act was eliminated by the severe restric-
tions placed on access to post-secondary education. Marriage
-traditional unions-was secured as the foundation of society
and encouraged through incentive initiatives and faith-based
service providers.
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PRWORA marked a sea-change in public assistance policy,
altering the fundamental basis of the social contract between
the government and low-income parents. It was the change
that Republicans had envisioned in the 1980s. Their time had
now come.
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(Endnotes)
1) Citations notes as Files reference material derived from the private
legislative files of Senator Moynihan.
2) Interviews with key Congressional personnel-Senators,
Representatives, Congressional aides-were conducted in 1992; in-
formation obtained from them is used throughout this paper.
3) They are, in order of publication: The Faiily: Preserving America's
Future, report to President Reaganby the White House Domestic Policy
Council Working Group on the Family, chaired by Under Secretary of
Education Gary L. Bauer, November, 1986; One Child in Four, Part I of
Investing in Poor Fainilies and Their Children: A Matter of Comnitment,
report by the American Public Welfare Association (APWA) and the
National Council of State Human Service Administrators, November
1986; A New Social Contract: Rethinking the Nature and Purpose of Public
Assistance, report submitted to Governor Mario Cuomo by the Task
Force on Poverty and Welfare, December, 1986; Upfrom Dependency:
A New National Public Assistance Strategy, report to President
Reagan by the White House Domestic Policy Council Low Income
Opportunity Working Group, chaired by Charles Hobbs, December
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1986; Ladders Out of Poverty, a report of the Project on the Welfare
of Families, co-chaired by Bruce Babbitt and Arthur Flemming,
American Horizons Foundation, Washington, D.C., December 1986;
NGA Welfare Reform Policy, National Governors' Association, adopted
February 24, 1987; A Community of Self-Reliance: The New Consensus
on Farily and Welftre, report of the Working Seminar on Family and
American Welfare Policy, Marquette University and the American
Enterprise Institute, March 1987.
4) Introduced by Rep. Augustus Hawkins (D-CA) it never got out of
Committee.
5) Introduced by Senator Ted Kennedy (D-MA), it was indefinitely
postponed by unanimous consent of the Senate.
6) Provisions of this bill were incorporated into H.R. 4848, "A bill to
enhance the competitiveness of American industry, " sponsored by
Rep. Dan Rostenkowski (D-IL) and was signed into law as P.L. 100-
418: Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 on August 23,
1988.
